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Introduction		The	 United	 States	 (U.S.)	 financial	 crisis	 of	 2008	 created	 a	 recession:	 the	 Great	Recession.	 A	 recession	 is	 technically	 declared	 over	 after	 two	 subsequent	quarters	of	economic	growth.	By	Q3	2009	this	recession	was	declared	over.		However	the	 laws	of	unintended	consequences	show	a	totally	different	picture.	Between	May	2007	and	October	2009	nearly	7	million	U.S.	individuals	lost	their	jobs	 and	 thereby	 their	 incomes.	 It	 took	 just	 over	 ten	 years	 before	 the	unemployment	 rate	 had	 dropped	 again	 to	 4.4%	 -to	 what	 it	 was	 in	 December	2006.		Equally	unintended	was	the	development	in	the	real	median	household	income.	In	 2007	 this	 income	was	 $59,534.	 It	 dropped	 to	 $54,569	 for	 2012	 and	 it	 only	returned	back	to	the	levels	of	2007,	by	2016.		Another	 unintended	 consequence	 was	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 fix	 for	 the	banks	in	trouble	and	those	for	individual	mortgage	borrowers	in	trouble.	Nearly	all	 banks	 were	 bailed	 out	 in	 2008,	 with	 the	 odd	 one	 declared	 bankrupt.	 For	individual	 households/mortgage	 borrowers	 there	 was	 no	 respite	 in	 being	pursued	 for	 outstanding	 mortgage	 debt.	 Over	 the	 period	 2007-2014	 21.228	million	 U.S.	 households	 were	 confronted	 with	 foreclosure	 proceedings.	 This	number	represented	41.4%	of	all	household	mortgage	holders	in	the	U.S.		House	 prices	 tumbled	 after	 2007.	 The	 S&P/Case-Shiller	 national	 home	 price	index	seasonally	adjusted	stood	at	184.52	in	January	2007	and	for	the	first	time	only	exceeded	this	level	by	November	2018	at	184.87.		New	housing	starts	also	dropped	significantly.	In	January	2006	the	number	was	2.273	 million	 annualized	 new	 starts.	 The	 trend	 line	 moved	 from	 annualized	490,000	new	starts	in	January	2009	to	1.230	million	by	January	2019.		Another	main	unintended	 consequence	of	 the	 financial	 crisis	was	 the	 effect	 on	U.S.	government	borrowings.	U.S.	Federal	debt	increased	by	$4.8	trillion	between	Q4	 2007	 and	Q4	 2010,	while	 real	 GDP	 still	 shrank.	 In	 three	 years	 the	 Federal	Government’s	 debt	 increased	 by	 more	 than	 50%	 and	 its	 growth	 did	 not	 stop	there.	Could	it	be	argued	that	the	government’s	debt	increase	paid	the	price	for	the	bankers’	follies?		Another	major	change	was	in	interest	rates.	Fed	funds	rates	have	not	been	so	low	for	over	60	years,	until	recently.		All	these	factors	show	that	a	more	streamlined	approach	to	economic	thinking	is	needed.	 The	 interactions	 between	 the	 financial	markets	 and	 the	 real	 economy	can	be	better	handled.	Some	suggestions	are	made	in	this	paper.																																																																																																																								
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1.	The	laws	of	unintended	consequences	
	The	effects	of	the	U.S.	financial	sector	activities	on	household	jobs	and	incomes;	on	 government	 debt	 levels	 and	 on	 other	 real	 sector	 activities	 such	 as	 new	housing	starts	may	all	be	well	recognized,	but	now	after	a	10	year	period	after	the	Great	Recession	they	can	be	fully	analyzed.		The	first	 fact	was	that	the	causes	of	 the	 financial	crisis	were	to	be	 found	in	the	actions	of	banks,	 finance	companies	and	of	hedge	 funds.	Home	mortgage	 loans	cannot	be	 created	by	hedge	 funds,	 so	 the	principal	 responsibility	 for	 excessive	mortgage	 lending	can	only	be	attributed	to	the	U.S.	banking	and	finance	sector,	including	foreign	banks	operating	in	the	U.S.		The	second	main	fact	was	that	U.S.	based	banks	and	finance	companies	wanted	to	offload	mortgage	credit	risks	to	third	parties	in	order	to	be	able	to	underwrite	more	 mortgage	 loans.	 They	 did	 so	 in	 several	 ways.	 Hedge	 funds	 bought	 up	 a	sizeable	share	of	these	loans.	Loan	obligations	were	split	and	sliced	into	various	components	and	packaged	for	sale	to	the	ultimate	investors,	supported	by	AA	or	AA+	ratings	from	the	U.S.	credit	rating	agencies.		Such	Mortgage-Backed	Securities	 (“MBS”)	were	bought	by	pension	 funds,	asset	managers	 and	 other	 interested	 parties	 around	 the	 world.	 American	 Insurance	Group	 (AIG),	 among	 others,	 offered	 credit	 default	 swaps,	 which	 made	 such	investments	a	 low	risk.	The	second	principle	was	 that	 such	securities	 could	be	traded	on	a	daily	basis,	either	on	stock	markets	or	through	market	makers.	The	conversion	from	long-term	lending	to	daily	pricing	was	complete:	the	conversion	process.		Was	daily	pricing	a	necessary	evil?	 It	depends	on	what	one	buys	and	what	 the	quality	 is	of	 the	underlying	product.	 	A	product	 that	 is	based	on	other	peoples’	savings	is	a	totally	different	product	than	any	consumer	good	for	sale.	Generally	households	 do	 not	 postpone	 consumption,	 if	 there	 is	 any	 chance	 of	 losing	 the	money	 saved.	 This	 applies	most	 of	 all	 to	 the	 lower	 income	 groups	 as	 they	 can	least	afford	such	losses.	However	the	lower	income	groups	and	nearly	all	of	the	younger	 generation	 households	 are	 the	 ones	 that	 cannot	 buy	 homes	 outright;	they	have	to	make	use	of	other	peoples’	savings.			The	 securitization	 of	 mortgage	 debt	 was	 widespread	 in	 the	 U.S.	 In	 2007	 all	securitized	mortgage	debt	reached	in	total	a	volume	of	$7.3	trillion.	By	Q4	2007,	the	level	of	households’	liabilities	on	home	mortgages	reached	the	level	of	$10.6	trillion. 1 	The	 securitization	 level	 represented	 nearly	 69%	 of	 all	 household	mortgages	and	of	which	the	level	of	subprime	mortgages	was	$1.3	trillion2.																																																																																																																																	1	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/HHMSDODNS	2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subprime_mortgage_crisis#Subprime_mortgage_market	
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																																																																																																																	The	Laws	of	Unintended	Consequences©Drs	Kees	De	Koning			If	the	U.S.	financial	regulators	had	decreed	that	subprime	mortgages	were	not	to	be	 included	 in	 MBS’s,	 for	 the	 simple	 reason	 that	 they	 represented	 potentially	high	 levels	 of	 losses,	 then	 the	 financial	 crisis	 would	 have	 had	 a	 very	 different	shape.	 It	 was	 not	 that	 daily	 pricing	 would	 have	 been	 a	 problem.	 It	 was	 the	inclusion	of	a	high	 level	of	potentially	doubtful	debtors,	which	undermined	 the	whole	 structure	 of	 securitization.	 If	 banks	 and	 finance	 companies	 had	 been	forced	 to	 keep	 subprime	 mortgages	 on	 their	 books,	 then	 the	 appetite	 for	extending	 such	 loans	 would	 soon	 have	 been	 lost.	 One	 should	 not	 equate	 the	freedom	of	enterprise	with	the	freedom	to	destroy	an	economy.		
	
2.	The	“costs”	of	the	recession	
	
2.1	The	costs	per	household	
	There	 are	 many	 ways	 to	 measure	 the	 actual	 costs	 of	 the	 Great	 Recession.	 A	“simple”	way	 is	 to	 add	 up	 all	 losses	 into	 a	 single	 figure.	 Researchers	 from	 the	Federal	 Reserve	 Bank	 of	 San	 Francisco	 have	 recently	 done	 so3.	 They	 assessed	that	each	U.S.	citizen	did	lose	a	lifetime	present	value	of	$70,000.	This	calculation	is	based	on	the	assertion	that	GDP	growth	levels	have	been	7%	below	the	long-term	trend	line	annually	ever	since	2008.	With	an	average	population	number	of	314.6	million	over	 the	period	2008-2018,	 the	 total	 cost	 for	U.S	 citizens	 can	be	estimated	at	$22.02	trillion.		The	 $70,000	 is	 a	 per	 capita	 amount	 and	 can	 be	 compared	 to	 the	 real	median	household	income	developments	over	the	period	2007-20194.	The	latest	January	2019	data	indicate	that	a	level	of	$63,688	was	reached,	which	is	6.98%	over	the	2007	 level.	December	2007	represents	 the	official	 start	of	 the	Great	Recession.	The	2012	level	was	$54,569	and	in	2016	the	real	median	household	income	had	climbed	back	to	just	over	the	2007	level	to	reach	$60,309.	With	2.5	persons	on	average	in	a	U.S.	household,	the	loss	for	each	U.S.	median	household	has	been	the	equivalent	 loss	 of	 275%	 of	 such	 U.S.	 household’s	median	 annual	 income:	 2	¾	years	 of	 gross	 income!	 	 For	 those	 families	 with	 an	 income	 below	 the	median,	including	the	7	million	individuals	who	lost	their	jobs	during	the	period	between	May	 2007	 and	 October	 2009,	 the	 impact	 must	 have	 been	 much	 higher.	 In	addition	 the	 loss	 in	 jobs	 lasted	 to	March	2017	before	 the	4.4%	unemployment	rate	was	reached	again.		There	 is	another	way	to	calculate	 the	real	 income	 losses	suffered	cumulatively.	One	 starts	 again	 with	 the	 real	 median	 income	 levels	 per	 household	 between	2007	 and	 2015.	 In	 2007	 this	 level	 was	 $59,534	 per	 household.	 It	 gradually	dropped	to	$54,569	in	2012	and	improved	to	$58,476	by																																																											3	https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2018/august/financial-crisis-at-10-years-will-we-ever-recover/	4	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MEHOINUSA672N/	
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																																																																																																																		The	Laws	of	Unintended	Consequences©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		2015.	Only	by	2016	did	 the	real	median	household	 income	exceed	the	$59,534	level	of	2007.	It	became	$60,309	in	2016.	From	2016,	households	were	no	longer	in	a	loss	position.	Taking	into	account	the	changing	number	of	households	over	the	 years	 2007-2015,	 the	 total	 real	 income	 losses	 added	 up	 to	 $3.182	 trillion	over	 this	 period.	 This	 figure	 does	 not	 include	 the	 losses	 on	 home	 values,	 on	outstanding	debts	and	on	the	collectively	owned	U.S.	government	debt	levels.		There	 are	 at	 least	 three	more	 aspects	 to	 be	 considered.	 The	 first	 is	 the	 actual	mortgage	debt	 level;	 the	second	the	decline	 in	U.S.	house	prices	values	and	the	third	being	the	developments	in	U.S.	government	debt	levels	per	capita.		The	 peak	 in	 outstanding	 home	 mortgage	 levels	 was	 reached	 in	 Q1	 2008	 at	 a	seasonally	adjusted	level	of	$10.695	trillion5.	This	outstanding	level	was	reduced	to	$9.451	trillion	by	Q3	2014,	a	net	reduction	of	$1.244	trillion	over	this	period6.	Whether	 households	 paid	 their	 debt	 back	 or	whether	 the	 financial	 institutions	accepted	write-downs,	 the	 result	 remains	 the	same:	 the	U.S.	 economy	 lost	$1.2	trillion	in	the	reduction	of	debts	and/or	in	savings	losses	over	this	period.	Over	the	 period	 2007-2014	 5.875	 million	 homes	 were	 repossessed 7 	out	 of	 an	approximate	 level	 of	 53	 million	 households	 who	 had	 a	 mortgage.	 One	 should	take	into	account	that	many	more	of	the	53	million	households	with	a	mortgage	were	 put	 under	 immense	 pressure	 through	 foreclosure	 filings	 and	 completed	foreclosures	 to	 pay	 back	 or	 reduce	 their	 mortgage	 amounts.	 Incomes	 that	otherwise	 would	 have	 been	 used	 for	 consumption	 purposes	 were	 diverted	 to	reducing	outstanding	debt	levels.			A	second	aspect	of	the	Great	Recession	was	the	drop	in	average	house	prices	and	a	 simultaneous	 drop	 in	 new	 housing	 starts.	 Over	 the	 period	 2007-2014	 5.875	million	 homes	were	 taken	 away	 from	 borrowers	 and	 handed	 back	 to	 lenders.	This	 fact	 had	 another	 unintended	 consequence:	 it	 created	 the	 drop	 in	 new	housing	 starts	and	 the	drop	 in	average	U.S.	home	sales	prices.	Over	 the	period	1997-2007	the	average	annual	new	housing	starts	were	at	a	level	of	1.7	million	new	starts	per	annum.	Over	the	period	2008-2014	the	average	annual	level	was	779,000	new	housing	starts	-	running	at	46%	of	the	1997-2007	period	average.	Another	 unintended	 consequence	 was	 the	 drop	 in	 actual	 house	 prices.	 The	average	U.S.	home	sales	price	did	increase	from	$176,200	in	1997	to	$313,600	by	2007.	However	this	average	price	dropped	by	just	over	16%	between	2007	and	2011	 from	$313,600	 to	$263,400.	 In	2011	 there	were	132.78	million	homes	 in	the	U.S.	The	 average	 loss	per	home	was	$50,200	over	 this	period.	The	 (paper)	loss	was	 $6.665	 trillion	 over	 the	 housing	 stock.	 This	 loss	was	 a	 paper	 loss	 for	many	families,	who	had	already	paid	off	their	mortgages;	for	others,	who	were	in	the	early	stages	of	repayment	of	their	mortgages	it	created	a																																																																																																																																																																											5	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/HHMSDODNS	6	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/HHMSDODNS	7	https://www.statisticbrain.com/home-foreclosure-statistics	
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																																																																																																																		The	Laws	of	Unintended	Consequences©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		great	problem.	The	asset	values	had	dropped;	their	incomes	had	dropped	but	the	outstanding	 debt	 levels	 had	 increased	 relative	 to	 house	 prices	 and	 average	income	levels.	No	wonder	that	11%	of	all	mortgage	holders	could	no	longer	fulfill	their	obligations.		The	drop	in	new	housing	starts	to	post-Great	Recession	levels	of	779,000	units	per	annum	represented	another	major	loss	to	the	overall	economic	health	of	the	nation.	 The	 lower	 construction	 level	 of	 921,000	 less	 new	 homes	 per	 annum	represented	 a	 loss	 of	 $242	 billion	 annually	 in	 turnover	 or	 over	 1.5%	 of	 GDP	annually	over	the	period	2008-2014.		The	U.S.	government,	just	like	individual	households,	also	incurred	a	major	loss.	In	 2007,	 the	 U.S.	 population	 numbered	 301.508	 million,	 the	 nominal	 median	income	was	$50,233	and	 the	U.S.	Federal	government	debt	was	$9.008	 trillion.	On	a	per	 capita	basis	 this	was	$29,876	per	each	citizen	 in	 the	U.S.	 In	2018	 the	population	 had	 grown	 to	 326.167	 million	 and	 the	 U.S	 government	 debt	 had	increased	to	$21,658	trillion	or	$66,402	per	every	citizen	in	the	U.S.	The	nominal	median	household	income	was		$62,175	in	2018.		Over	 the	 10-year	 period,	 the	 ratio	 of	 U.S.	 government	 debt	 per	 capita	deteriorated	rapidly.	The	ratio	increased	from	59.5%	per	each	American	in	2007	to	106.8%	by	2018.		A	substantial	share	of	this	deterioration	in	government	debt	per	 capita	 can	 be	 directly	 attributed	 to	 the	 Great	 Recession	 as	 incomes	 and	economic	 activities	 fell.	 For	 those	 who	 were	 lucky	 enough	 to	 remain	 in	employment,	real	median	household	incomes	declined	between	2007	and	2015,	and	only	were	to	begin	to	recover	from	2016	onwards.		The	conclusion	out	of	 this	all	 is	 that	the	 losses	to	 individuals,	 to	households,	 to	the	 government,	 to	 the	 business	 sector	 and	 to	 investors	 in	 mortgage-backed	securities	was	a	multiple	of	the	$1.3	trillion	of	outstanding	subprime	mortgages.	It	should	also	be	noted	that	this	only	reflects	the	U.S.	situation	and	not	the	cost	to	other	economies	around	the	world.		
2.2	The	economic	consequences	
	One	 should	 make	 a	 distinction	 between	 a	 market	 driven	 and	 money	 driven	recession.	A	potential	market	driven	recession	arises	when	the	demand	for	one	or	 another	 consumer	 good	 reduces	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 such	 drop	 in	 demand	creates	a	sizable	excess	capacity	for	suppliers.	This	can	happen	due	to	an	upward	pressure	 on	 input	 prices:	 raw	 materials,	 intermediate	 goods	 or	 shortages	 of	labor	for	instance.			A	money-driven	recession	has	a	totally	different	origin.	The	Great	Recession	was	not	caused	overnight;	rather	 it	was	a	recession	that	developed	out	of	a	gradual	process	 that	 commenced	 from	 2004.	 This	 process	 overloaded	 individual	households	with	debt	obligations	not	on	basis	of	income	levels,	but	on	the	basis	of	asset	prices.	Initially	asset	prices	showed	a	pattern	of	the	more	money			
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																																																																																																																	The	Laws	of	Unintended	Consequences©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		pumped	 into	 mortgage	 loans,	 the	 higher	 the	 house	 prices	 became,	 especially	between	 2004	 and	 2007.	 The	 links	 between	 incomes	 levels	 and	 mortgage	borrowings	 faded	away	 through	 the	 actions	of	 the	 lenders	 and	 also	due	 to	 the	generally	 irrational	 exuberance	 of	 a	 substantial	 share	 of	 the	 mortgage	borrowers,	who	believed	or	hoped	that	house	prices	could	only	go	up.		The	history	of	U.S.	market	driven	or	money	driven	crises	 is	well	described	 in	a	publication8	by	 The	 Balance.	 The	 1973-1975	 recession	was	 caused	 by	 a	 sharp	increase	in	oil	prices:	a	market	driven	crisis.	The	1980-1982	crisis	was	caused	by	a	 steep	 hike	 in	 interest	 rates	 to	 combat	 inflation	 as	well	 as	 Iranian	 oil	 export	embargo:	a	money	driven	and	a	market	driven	crisis.	The	1990-1992	crisis	was	a	savings	and	loan	crisis:	a	money	driven	crisis.	The	2001	crisis	was	also	a	money	driven	 crisis	 as	 the	 speculation	 about	 the	 values	 of	 dot.com	 companies	 led	 to	substantial	 financial	 losses.	 The	 2008-2009	 crisis	 was	 clearly	 a	 money	 driven	crisis,	induced	by	the	realized	or	anticipated	losses	on	subprime	mortgages.		The	solutions	to	a	market	driven	and	money	driven	crises	are	quite	different	as	will	be	explained	in	Chapter	3.	
	Banks	 and	 finance	 companies	 in	 the	 U.S.	 did	 not	 set	 out	 to	 cause	 the	 Great	Recession;	neither	did	 the	Federal	Reserve.	 It	was	 the	cumulative	action	of	 the	combined	 banking	 and	 financial	 sector,	 the	 mispricing	 of	 mortgage	 risks,	 the	transfer	of	such	risks	to	third	parties,	the	conversion	of	long-term	debt	titles	into	daily	 tradable	ones	and	 the	 lack	of	preventive	measures	 that	were	 responsible	for	the	Great	Recession.	It	was	also	the	total	lack	of	appreciation	of	what	such	a	lending	 crisis	 could	 and	 would	 do	 to	 jobs,	 incomes,	 government	 debt	 and	economic	growth.	Is	it	not	telling	that	the	researchers	from	the	Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	San	Francisco	are	wondering	whether	the	U.S.	economic	growth	rate	will	ever	recover	to	 its	 long-term	trend	 line,	after	having	 lost	7%	annually	over	the	last	10	years?		The	economic	consequences	were	not	only	restricted	to	the	U.S.,	but	due	to	the	sales	 of	U.S.	 home	mortgage	 credit	 risks	 to	 overseas	 buyers,	 the	 consequences	were	 experienced	 widely	 around	 the	 world,	 both	 through	 the	 financial	 losses	incurred	overseas	and	to	the	subsequent	deterioration	in	the	purchasing	power	of	a	large	swathe	of	the	U.S.	population.	Banks	had	to	be	rescued	not	just	in	the	U.S.	 but	 also	 in	 the	 U.K.,	 Germany,	 Belgium,	 Holland,	 Spain	 and	 some	 other	countries.		If	one	compares	the	level	of	securitized	subprime	mortgages	of	$1.3	trillion	out	of	the	$7.3	trillion	MBS’s,	one	can	only	be	astonished	by	the	destructive	capacity	to	 an	 economy	 of	 selling	 doubtful	 debtor	 loans	 to	 the	 financial	 markets.	European	countries	were	also	strongly	affected	by	the																																																																																																																																																																															8	https://www.thebalance.com/the-history-of-recessions-in-the-united-states-3306011	
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																																																																																																																					The	Laws	of	Unintended	Consequences©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		subprime	mortgage	crisis.	The	 first	 signs	 that	 something	was	amiss	came	 from	BNP	Paribas	 in	2007,	when	 it	decided	 in	August	of	 that	year	 that	 there	was	an	absolute	 lack	 of	 liquidity	 for	 three	 of	 its	 asset	 backed	 investment	 funds	 and	thereby	it	stopped	trading	in	these	funds.	The	situation	caused	by	U.S.	doubtful	debtors	had	a	significant	impact	on	the	U.K.	and	other	European	markets9.			Money	 driven	 recessions	 can	 have	 a	 number	 of	 causes.	 For	 instance,	governments	can	be	the	cause	of	a	money	driven	recession.	This	can	happen	if	a	government	 borrows	 excessively	 on	 international	markets,	 especially	 if	 this	 is	done	 in	 currencies	 other	 than	 their	 own.	Banks	 and	 the	whole	 financial	 sector	(including	hedge	 funds,	 asset	managers,	pension	 funds	and	others)	 can	also	be	the	 cause	 of	 a	 money	 driven	 recession	 if	 they	 lend	 excessively	 compared	 to	incomes	of	governments,	companies	or	 large	sections	of	 individual	households.	Lending	to	companies	can	be	in	the	shape	of	corporate	bonds	for	instance.			In	 section	 2.1	 it	 was	 explained	 that	 jobs,	 incomes,	 home	 values,	 new	 housing	starts	 and	 government	debt	 levels	were	 all	 significantly	 affected	 long	 after	 the	recession	 was	 declared	 over.	 The	 laws	 of	 unintended	 consequences	 created	 a	permanent	 change	 in	 economic	 growth	 patterns;	 a	 permanent	 change	 in	 U.S.	government	debt	levels;	a	near	halving	of	the	new	housing	starts	level	after	the	recession;	 a	very	 slow	recovery	of	 real	household	 incomes	and	a	very	 sluggish	return	to	full	employment	levels.			What	 should	 also	 be	mentioned	 is	 the	 economic	 damage	 that	 the	 inclusion	 of	subprime	mortgages	 in	MBS’s	 caused.	 The	 cost	 per	 household	 over	 a	 ten-year	period,	 as	 set	 out	 in	 section	 2.1,	 was	 a	 great	 multiple	 of	 the	 total	 volume	 of	securitized	sub-prime	mortgage	levels	in	2007.	The	drop	in	economic	activity,	in	jobs,	in	real	income	levels,	in	lower	levels	of	new	housing	starts,	in	increases	in	U.S.	 government	 debt	 levels	 and	 in	 lower	 house	 prices	 far	 exceeded	 the	 $1.3	trillion	 of	 subprime	mortgages	 included	 in	 the	marketed	 $7.3	 trillion	 of	MBS’s	sold	to	the	financial	markets.				
3.	The	responses	to	the	money	driven	recession	of	2008-2009	
	The	 U.S.	 government’s	 response	 to	 the	 Great	 Recession	 can	 be	 described	 as	 a	reaction	to	a	market	driven	recession	rather	than	a	money	driven	one.		Its	 first	major	 step	was	 to	 sign	 into	 law	 in	October	 2008,	 the	 “Troubled	 Asset	Relief	Program”:	TARP10.	This	Program	was	originally	authorized	for	an	amount	of	$700	billion.	Later	in	2010	it	was	reduced	to	$450	billion.	The	Program	was																																																											9	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bnpparibas-subprime-funds-idUSWEB612920070809	10	https://www.history.com/topics/21st-century/troubled-asset-relief-program	
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																																																																																																																			The	Laws	of	Unintended	Consequences©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		managed	 by	 the	 Treasury	 Department.	 It	 allocated	 $250	 billion	 to	 purchase	preference	 shares	 in	 8	 U.S.	 banks.	 It	 allocated	 $82	 billion	 to	 support	 the	 auto	industry;	 $70	billion	 to	 support	AIG;	 $46	billion	 to	 help	Americans	 confronted	with	foreclosure	proceedings	and	$27	billion	to	restart	credit	markets.		The	Federal	Reserve	also	took	action.	It	rapidly	lowered	the	Fed	funds	rate	from	5.26%	 in	 July	2007	 to	0.16%	by	December	200811.	The	 longest	period	of	ultra	low	interest	rates	began	and	only	by	May	2017	did	the	interest	rate	marginally	exceeded	the	previous	lowest	rate	dating	back	all	the	way	from	1955.		The	Fed	also	 took	major	 steps	 in	buying	up	$3.7	 trillion	of	U.S.	Treasuries	and	mortgage	backed	securities	over	the	period	2009-2012.12		The	U.S	government	 spent	$4.8	 trillion	more	 than	 it	 received	 in	 taxes	over	 the	period	Q4	2007-Q4	2013,	while	real	GDP	levels	still	dropped.		The	distinction	between	a	market	driven	recession	and	a	money	driven	one	was	not	 used	 to	 help	 solve	 the	 problems	 caused	 by	 the	 subprime	mortgage	 crisis.	Market	 driven	 recessions	 require	 macro	 solutions,	 such	 as	 lowering	 interest	rates;	even	quantitative	easing	exercises	would	fall	under	this	heading,	as	would	additional	 government	 spending	 levels.	 U.S.	 banks	 were	 nearly	 all	 rescued,	interest	 rates	 were	 lowered	 to	 their	 lowest	 level	 for	 nearly	 60	 years	 and	 U.S.	government	debts	saw	their	fastest	increase	from	2008-2013	since	war	times.		It	 may	 be	 appropriate	 here	 to	 quote	 an	 Aristotle	 saying:	 “History	 represents	things	 as	 they	 are,	while	 fiction	 represents	 them	 as	 they	might	 be	 or	 ought	 to	be.”13		Economic	history	 is	now	known	and	 it	 is	perhaps	a	good	 time	 to	discuss	what	might	have	been	done	to	avoid	the	Global	Financial	Crisis.		Subprime	mortgages	were	a	household	related	debt.	The	mix	of	prime,	Alt	A	and	subprime	mortgages	 into	MBS’s	 increased	 the	risk	 levels	over	such	MBS’s.	Had	each	 type	of	 security	only	 contained	either	Prime	or	Alt	A	mortgages,	 it	would	have	been	 likely	 that	 losses	on	such	 loans	would	have	been	 foreseeable	by	 the	buyers	and	incorporated	in	the	purchase	price.	Bankers	devised	more	“creative”	methods	and	incorporated	all	types	of	mortgages	as	well	as	all	types	of	stripping	and	mixing	 of	 such	mortgages.	 Not	 only	 that,	 U.S.	 credit	 rating	 agencies	 often	awarded	the	products	an	AA	or	AA+	rating,	of	course																																																																																																																																																																																11	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/fedfunds	12	https://www.cnbc.com/2016/06/13/12-trillion-of-qe-and-the-lowest-rates-in-5000-years-for-this.html	13http://libertarianfictionauthors.com/	
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																																																																																																																			The	Laws	of	Unintended	Consequences©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		without	accepting	any	risk	themselves,	in	case	reality	turned	out	to	be	less	rosy	than	predicted.		This	 process	 created	 an	 even	 higher	 level	 of	 risks	 for	 the	 investors			notwithstanding	 that	 those	 investors	 could	 obtain	 credit	 default	 swaps	 from,	among	others,	AIG.	The	underlying	obligors	as	the	ultimate	borrowers	remained	the	 same:	 the	 individual	 households	 -	 a	 real	 family	 or	 an	 individual	 person	somewhere	in	the	U.S.		It	 is	 for	 this	 reason	 that	money	driven	recession	requires	actions	on	 the	micro	level	 given	 that	 individual	 households	 were	 locked	 into	 long-term	 debt	problems,	 due	 to	 the	 excessive	 lending	 approvals	 from	 banks	 and	 financial	companies;	69%	of	all	these	long-term	debts	were	subsequently	converted	into	daily	tradable	obligations.		The	actual	actions	that	were	taken	led	to	the	many	unintended	consequences	as	has	been	spelled	out	in	Chapters	1	and	2,	resulting	in	17.205	million	completed	foreclosures	 over	 the	 period	 2007-2014	 and	 5.875	 million	 homes	 being	repossessed.	 A	 micro	 financial	 problem	 had	 been	 turned	 into	 a	 huge	 macro-economic	 nightmare.	 The	 laws	 of	 unintended	 consequences	 were	 many	 and	some	 of	 them,	 like	 the	 U.S.	 government	 debt	 situation,	 have	 created	 a	 near	permanent	 change	 in	 economic	 circumstances.	 The	 trajectory	 of	U.S.	 economic	growth	has	also	been	altered,	at	 least	 for	over	 the	 last	10	years,	with	a	growth	level	7%	below	the	long-term	growth	path.		Could	there	have	been	a	successful	micro	approach	that	could	have	avoided	this	major	economic	upheaval?		It	was	remarkable	that,	in	2008,	nearly	all-economic	energy	was	focused	on	what	happened	to	the	banks	and	finance	companies	in	the	U.S.	Nearly	all	were	bailed	out	 and	 the	penalties	meted	out	 to	 them	reflected	only	 a	 fraction	of	 the	 losses	that	 individual	 households,	 companies	 and	 the	U.S.	 and	 overseas	 governments	suffered	as	a	result	of	their	actions.	Is	 it	not	 ironic	that	the	fines	collected	from	banks	were	not	 returned	 to	 the	mortgage	borrowers,	but	were	used	 for	public	works	 projects?	What	was	missing	was	 a	 comprehensive	micro	 approach	 that	would	have	started	with	the	individual	households	in	financial	trouble.		Historically	 the	 U.S.	 government	 has	 been	 actively	 involved	 in	 the	 funding	 of	home	mortgages	through	its	government-sponsored	enterprises	like	Fannie	May,	Freddy	Mac	and	Ginny	May.	These	enterprises	offered	guarantees	or	 long-term	fixed	rate	funding.	When	doubts	arose	about	the	mortgage	market	in	the	U.S.,	the	U.S.	government	made	it	clear	that	these	institutions	were	of	vital	importance	to	the	proper	functioning	of	mortgage	lending	flows.	After	2008,	the	percentage	of	new	 mortgages	 granted	 with	 the	 help	 of	 these	 institutions	 rose	 substantially,	albeit	these	levels	were	far	below	the	pre	Great	Recession	levels.																																																																																																																																																																																																							
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4.	What	could	have	been	done?	
		In	 order	 to	 discuss	what	 could	 have	 been	 done	 one	 has	 to	 split	 the	mortgage	borrowers	 into	 two	 groups:	 the	 group	 of	 owner-occupiers	 and	 the	 group	 of	“homes	for	rent”	owners.			The	 TARP	 program	 allocated	 $46	 billion	 to	 help	 Americans	 confronted	 with	foreclosure	 proceedings.	 As	 aforementioned,	 the	 level	 of	 subprime	 mortgages	outstanding	 in	2008	stood	at	$1.3	trillion	out	of	 the	$7.3	trillion	 in	outstanding	MBS.	The	Tarp	allocation	was	enough	for	only	3.5%	of	the	outstanding	subprime	mortgages	 and	 for	 only	 0.63%	 of	 the	 $7.3	 trillion	 MBS	 outstanding.	 Very	 few	experts	 could	 have	 told	 any	 layman	what	 the	mix	was	 between	 subprime	 and	other	elements	of	a	specific	MBS.	When	in	August	2007,	BNP	Paribas14	declared	that	 there	was	 no	 liquidity	 any	 longer	 in	 three	 of	 its	 U.S.	MBS	 funds;	 the	 fear	factor	 took	 over.	 Nearly	 all	 MBS	 structures	 became	 suspect,	 including	 a	 fear	factor	 for	 the	 banks	 that	 were	 holding	 portions	 of	 these	 mortgage-backed	securities	on	their	own	books.		A	possible	solution	to	the	Great	Recession	and	thereby	the	Global	Financial	Crisis	could	 have	 started	 with	 the	 micro	 level	 group	 of	 owner-occupiers.	 These	households	clearly	had	bought	for	the	long-term,	but	were	in	the	early	stages	of	repayment	of	their	mortgages.	Some	of	them	may	have	been	induced	by	the	low	start-up	variable	interest	rates	in	the	hope	of	consolidation	of	the	loan	at	a	later	stage.		The	 aim	 of	 such	 a	 micro-based	 scheme	 could	 have	 been	 to	 help	 individual	households	to	avoid	foreclosure,	stay	in	their	home,	to	continue	to	consume	and	pay	taxes.	As	average	house	prices	differ	across	the	States	and	cities	in	the	U.S.,	one	can	only	develop	a	theoretical	case	for	Mr.	and	Mrs.	Sam.		Mr.	 and	Mrs.	 Sam	are	 a	 young	 couple	with	 one	 child.	 	 They	bought	 a	 house	 in	March	2006	 for	$183,000	that	was	60%	of	 the	average	price	of	a	new	home	 in	that	 year.	 They	 had	 a	 combined	 income	 of	 $48,201	 in	 2006,	 which	 was	 the	median	nominal	household	income.	Mr.	Sam	worked	for	an	insurance	company	and	Mrs.	Sam	worked	part	time	as	a	shop	assistant.	Mr.	Sam’s	parents	had	helped	the	young	family	with	a	gift	of	$18,300	to	get	the	family	on	the	property	ladder.	The	mortgage	 amount	 needed	was	 $164,700.	 	 Their	mortgage	 adviser	 advised	them	to	take	a	low	cost	startup	loan	for	two	years	at	2.6%	per	annum	and	then	change	to	a	Freddy	Mac	loan,	which	at	the	time	of	buying	the	house	would	have	costs	6.32%	per	annum.	Of	course	 the	cheap	 loan	meant	 that	 in	2008,	 the	 loan	amount	 needed	 to	 include	 at	 least	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 6.32%	 and	 the	2.6%	plus	costs;	i.e.	3.9%	per	annum.																																																																																																																																																							14https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bnpparibas-subprime-funds-idUSWEB612920070809		
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																																																																																																																		The	Laws	of	Unintended	Consequences©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		The	payments	 in	year	1	and	2	(to	March	2008)	would	have	been	 interest	costs	$4,282.20	 plus	 the	 repayment	 of	 $5,490	 equaling	 $9,772.20	 in	 year	 1	 plus	 a	deferred	 interest	 amount	 of	 $6,528.60.	 For	 the	 second	 year	 the	 repayment	amount	would	 have	 remained	 the	 same	 at	 $5,490,	 the	 interest	 amount	would	have	 been	 $4,139.50:	 in	 total	 $9,629.50	 plus	 a	 deferred	 interest	 amount	 of	$6,783.20.	The	effect	of	the	two-year	debt	servicing	payments	of	$19,401.70	was	substantially	wiped	out	by	the	amount	of	deferred	interest	of	$13,311.80.		In	2008	the	family	obtained	a	refinancing	loan	through	Freddy	Mac.	Mr.	and	Mrs.	Sam	 would	 have	 seen	 their	 outstanding	 mortgage	 debt	 level	 only	 reduced	 to	$158,611	 with	 a	 jump	 in	 annual	 servicing	 costs	 to	 $15,614	 (interest	 plus	principal	amount).		From	a	gross	combined	salary	of	$48,201	and	a	tax	take	of	$6,481,	the	payment	of	 $15,614	 for	 the	 mortgage	 payment	 represented	 37.4%	 of	 the	 Sam’s	 net	household	 income,	 before	 costs	 of	 insurance,	 maintenance,	 transportation,	medical	care	and	utility	costs	are	taken	into	account.		It	 is	widely	regarded	in	the	U.S.,	 that	any	percentage	of	net	 income	allocated	to	mortgage	 debt	 servicing	 over	 28%	 of	 net	 income	 exposes	 families	 to	 serious	risks	in	case	of	unemployment,	illness	or	other	disturbances	of	income	flows	like	childbirth15.	Very	often	the	lowest	income	classes	are	most	at	risk.		The	 question	 arises	 therefore:	 “What	 could	 have	 been	 done	 to	 prevent	 home	mortgages	debt	 servicing	 to	be	 the	millstone	dragging	 the	whole	U.S.	 economy	down?”		There	 is	no	need	 to	worry	about	 the	 top	25%	of	 income	earners.	They	usually	have	savings	to	fall	back	on	in	case	of	unemployment,	plus	their	houses	are	often	worth	many	times	the	median	house	price	levels.			Economists	 should	 have	 been	worried	 about	 the	 lower	 income	 families,	 those	with	 incomes	 below	 the	median	 income	 levels,	 the	 very	 families	 in	 the	 lower	quartiles	 and	 especially	 the	 group	 of	 households	 that	 acquired	 a	 home	 say	between	2004	and	2008.		A	possible	solution	could	have	been	to	offer	these	families	the	option	of	a	“sale,	leaseback	 and	 repurchase	 of	 their	 home”.	 Such	 solution	 could	 have	worked	 as	follows:	a	U.S.	State	agency	(either	an	existing	one	or	a	newly	created	one)	offers	the	affected	owner-occupier	family	the	opportunity	to	sell	their	home	to	the	U.S	government	 at	 the	 outstanding	 mortgage	 level.	 The	 government	 subsequently	charges	the	family	a	rent	for	staying	in	the	home	with	a	rent	limit																																																													15	https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/12/reasonable-amount-of-debt.asp	
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																																																																																																															The	Laws	of	Unintended	Consequences©Drs	Kees	De	Koning			of	25%	of	the	family’s	net	 income	after	deduction	of	government	 income	taxes.	The	U.S.	government	settles	the	loans	with	the	loan	providers,	but	deducts	10%	for	miss-selling	 costs.	Households	agree	 to	maintain	 their	 temporary	 leasehold	out	of	their	own	funds.		Each	household	participating	in	the	scheme	would	be	given	the	right	to	buy	back	their	home	at	the	original	transfer	price.		Such	a	sale,	lease	back	and	repurchase	scheme	has	many	economic	advantages.			Firstly	 it	 helps	 young	 (and	 median	 and	 low	 income)	 families	 to	 stay	 in	 their	homes,	rather	than	the	upheaval,	both	in	costs	and	in	loss	of	savings,	to	have	to	move,	 because	 of	 repossession.	 Secondly	 the	 costs	 are	 spread	 across	 the	household	as	well	as	the	lenders	via	a	penalty	level.	Thirdly	the	U.S.	government	is	able	 to	borrow	at	 the	cheapest	 rate	of	all	households	 in	 the	U.S.	Finally,	 and	perhaps	 most	 importantly,	 it	 avoids	 the	 economic	 downturns	 as	 described	above.		For	 homeowners	with	more	 than	 one	 home,	 the	 proposed	 scheme	would	 only	apply	 to	 the	 home	 they	 lived	 in.	 For	 the	 other	 homes	 they	 owned	 it	 would	depend	if	there	were	tenants	in	the	home.	In	such	case	the	rent	payers	would	be	treated	as	 	potential	 future	homeowners.	They	could	stay	 in	the	home	with	the	same	25%	of	net	income	rule	applied,	but	with	the	same	proviso	that	the	home	repairs	and	maintenance	costs	are	 for	 their	account.	The	 tenants	 could	also	be	given	 the	 option	 to	 ultimately	 buy	 the	 property	 at	 the	 price	 for	 which	 the	government	agency	had	acquired	 the	property.	For	homeowners	with	multiple	homes,	 the	 scheme	 would	 only	 apply	 to	 those,	 who	 were	 in	 arrears	 on	 their	mortgage	loans.		The	U.S.	median	house	price	in	Q1	2007	was	$257,400;	by	Q3	2008	it	had	fallen	by	 12%	 over	 18	 months.	 Rapid	 action	 would	 have	 been	 needed	 to	 stop	 an	accumulation	of	delinquencies.	Assume	that	the	average	outstanding	mortgage	of	the	 potential	 delinquents	 was	 $180,000	 in	 2008.	 Assume	 that	 the	 correct	prediction	was	made	about	the	potential	total	number	of	home	repossessions	of	5,875,000;	 then	 the	 Government	 agency	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 sale,	 leaseback	 and	repurchase	scheme	would	have	needed	about	$1.06	trillion	in	funds,	to	convert	the	outstanding	mortgage	debt	in	cash	and	repay	such	funds	to	the	lenders.	Each	of	 the	 originating	 lenders	 would	 be	 charged	 a	 tax	 of	 say	 10%	 of	 the	 amount	provided	to	their	customers.	For	good	order	sake,	this	is	less	than	the	fines	levied	up	 to	 2017	 from	 the	 various	 banks	 for	 their	 participation	 in	 the	 sub-prime	mortgage	crisis16.	The	latter	amounted	to	$150	billion.																																																												16	https://www.dw.com/en/financial-crisis-bank-fines-hit-record-10-years-after-market-collapse/a-40044540	
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																																																																																																																	The	Laws	of	Unintended	Consequences©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		Assume	that	the	average	household	involved	in	the	5,875,000	repossessions	had	an	 average	 income	 of	 $30,000	 after	 tax,	 and	 then	 each	 household	would	 have	paid	 $7,500	 per	 annum	 for	 the	 right	 to	 stay	 in	 their	 home,	 for	 which	 the	ownership	 had	 been	 transferred	 to	 the	 Government	 Agency.	 	 Such	 payments	would	 represent	 an	 income	 for	 the	 Agency	 of	 $44	 billion	 per	 annum.	 In	 effect	such	 income	 would	 more	 than	 compensate	 for	 the	 government’s	 borrowing	costs.	
	
5.	Some	conclusions		It	should	be	understood	that	the	aim	of	the	sale-leaseback-repurchase	scheme	is	to	avoid	all	of	the	aforementioned	unintended	consequences.		Mortgage	debt	is	and	should	be	first	and	foremost	a	claim	on	the	income	of	those	who	 cannot	 afford	 to	 purchase	 a	 home	 outright:	 mostly	 the	 young	 and	 lower	income	earning	families.	If	the	income	levels	become	insufficient	to	service	such	loans,	because	of	 the	collective	economic	error	of	overloading	households	with	mortgage	 debts,	 then	 the	 way	 out	 to	 prevent	 the	 mentioned	 unintended	consequences	is	not	to	let	the	system	sort	itself	out,	but	to	intervene	and	help	an	economy	to	reduce	the	fall-out	of	such	economic	error.	Such	intervention	should	not	 be	 based	 on	 the	 usual	 solutions	 to	 a	 market	 driven	 recession:	 such	 as	lowering	 interest	 rates,	 more	 general	 government	 spending	 and	 even	quantitative	easing.	None	of	these	would	have	helped	to	keep	households	in	jobs,	as	the	big	shift	in	disposable	incomes	came	from	the	pressure	on	households	to	pay	off	their	mortgage	early	as	debt	levels	started	to	exceed	the	home	values.			To	regard	the	Great	Recession	as	a	money	driven	economic	crisis	would	have	led	to	a	different	type	of	help:	the	temporary	transfer	of	mortgage	debt	obligations	to	a	government	body.	Such	help	would	have	had	many	benefits,	like	keeping	up	demand	 in	 an	 economy	 as	 family	 incomes	 would	 not	 have	 been	 reduced;	government	debt	 levels	would	not	have	 increased	so	 fast	as	 tax	receipts	would	have	been	kept	up	due	to	higher	economic	growth	levels	and	interest	rates	could	have	 been	 kept	 up	 at	 a	 somewhat	 higher	 level,	 so	 as	 to	 stimulate	 savings,	especially	for	future	pensions.		The	concept	 that	debts	help	 to	create	wealth	may	be	 true	 for	some	companies,	but	 it	 is	 certainly	 an	 ill-conceived	 principle	 for	 individual	 households.	 Savings	should	create	wealth	for	individual	households.		In	two	previous	papers	on	Conversion	Theory,	the	writer	explains	the	effects	of	converting	long-term	mortgage	loans	into	daily	tradable	obligations	(paper	I).	In	paper	 II	 the	 writer	 sets	 out	 a	 possible	 solution	 for	 a	 combined	 economic	downturn	 in	a	number	of	world	economies.	As	 the	Great	Recession	has	shown,	money	and	especially	the	U.S.	dollar	has	a	tendency	to	be	the	currency	of	choice	for	many	overseas	countries,	therefore	a	national	solution,	like	the	one	suggested	in	this	paper	is	vital,	but	international	co-operation	is	almost	as	important.	Many	U.S.	based	companies	sell	their	products	and	services	around		
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																																																																																																																																																																																										The	Laws	of	Unintended	Consequences©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		the	 world	 and	 so	 do	 companies	 based	 in	 other	 countries.	 Countries	 are	interdependent	these	days,	much	more	so	then	half	a	century	ago!		The	choice	in	economic	management	is	not	one	between	a	capitalist	system	or	a	socialist	one	based	on	government	ownership	of	major	industries;	the	choice	is	one	of	correcting	the	errors	made	by	a	capitalist	system	and	reduce	the	impact	of	such	errors.	The	money	driven	corrections	as	set	out	above	could	be	helpful.		Drs.	Kees	De	Koning	Chorleywood	U.K.	19th	March	2019																		
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